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Mobile marketSince 2009, the Croatian mobile market has been subject to various negative influences,
including the economic crisis and a 6% telecommunication tax on mobile operator gross
revenues. This paper took advantage of this tumultuous period to explore the effects of
quality change on monthly price of cell phone plans in Croatia during 2009–2013. We used
hedonic modeling to calculate hedonic price and quality indices over the period. The
results indicate that cell phone plan prices slowly fell rather than rose, and that plan
quality increased. The results are consistent with trends in other European countries with
similar market conditions.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Telecommunications services have been a major driver of the global economy in recent years (Roeller and Waverman,
2001; Koutroumpis et al., 2011; Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2011), and they are no less important to Croatia, where the com-
bined revenues of the three major operators reached $279 million in the fourth quarter of 2012 alone (Economic Institute
Zagreb, 2013). Despite the rapid development of the telecommunications industry in Croatia, few statistical indicators have
been devised to track the evolution of prices and services on the market.
Since 2009, the Croatian mobile market has been subject to various negative economic conditions, which have led to more
cautious spending by Croatian mobile operators, a significant decrease in revenues, and most importantly, the first drop in
call and SMS volume in the industry’s history as well as a significant drop in overall number of mobile users (Sutedja and
Unger, 2009). While the global economic crisis has played a key role in these effects, a tax introduced by the Croatian
government in August 2009 on gross revenues on calls and messaging has likely also contributed. The government initially
presented the tax as a measure to stabilize public spending and avoid a reduction in public sector salaries and retirement
pay-outs. These negative market conditions likely led operators to rethink their cell phone plan price and quality in order
to retain market share and compensate for loss of revenue. The tax in Croatia was discriminatory against mobile telephony
and jeopardized competition because it was not applied to fixed-line communications, which compete directly with mobile
telephony in some market segments. Though the tax proved short-lived, ultimately being repealed in 2012, it created
significant economic uncertainty for mobile operators because the government initially announced that it would remain
in force until the end of the country’s economic recession.
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imposed in October 2010 a special tax on telecommunications services to increase public revenues due to extensive
outlays for health care, public education and pensions (Deak, 2010). Tax rates corresponded to 0–6.5% depending on
operators’ gross revenues. In 2009, Spain and France imposed a tax of 0.9% gross revenues in order to finance public
television, which would then be forbidden from showing advertising, but the European Commission (EC) ruled the tax
illegal. Concurrently, Greece levied a telecommunication tax of 12–20% on mobile postpaid subscriptions depending on
the amount of the monthly bill, as well as a 12% tax on prepaid cards (Koutroumpis et al., 2011). Albania and Ukraine
levied similar taxes.
This tumultuous period in the mobile telephony industry has had intriguing effects, which are not entirely understood. An
analysis by Deloitte (2011) predicted that these disturbances of market conditions would cause an increase in quality, and
slow decrease in cell phone plan prices, rather than the increase that might be expected from simple classical theory. A slow
decrease in prices is, in fact, suggested by the telecommunication consumer price index (TCPI) published by the Croatian
Bureau of Statistics, but this does not tell the whole story, since TCPI aggregates telecommunications equipment1 and
services.
It is not yet known how changes in monthly price during the study period interacted with changes in quality of cell phone
plans. This question is important to investigate because mobile operators are increasingly exploiting both price and cell
phone plan differentiation to maintain market share in the rapidly evolving telecommunications sector (Smith, 2012;
Gautam and Kumar, 2011; Paulrajan and Rajkumar, 2011; Corrocher and Zirulia, 2010).
Therefore the focus of the present work is twofold. First is to explore the rarely use of hedonic methods for cell phone
plans. Second is to explore the relationship between monthly price and quality of cell phone plans for the period
2009–2013. These details may serve as a way to derive preliminary conclusions about cell phone plan differences among
the major mobile network operators in Croatia in response to the challenging market environment. To the authors’
knowledge, this is the first such detailed assessment of this relationship in Croatia and Eastern and Central Europe.2. Literature review
2.1. Price index and quality index in a mobile telephony market
Mobile service providers must respond to diverse, sometimes conflicting, market factors, including new technological
advancement, rules and regulations, taxes, evolving user needs and demographics, and the emergence of new business
models (Harno et al., 2009). As a result, mobile operators have been offering increasingly complex and varied products
and cell phone plans. To understand the heterogeneous, rapidly changing mobile telecommunications industry,
economists, analysts and mobile operators themselves want to be able to track how prices of products and cell phone
plans change over time, but this can be quite difficult to do precisely because of the rapid technological changes
(Maresca and Montella, 2000).
Products and cell phone plans currently on the market cannot be directly compared with those that used to be available
since operators are constantly introducing new versions of cell phone plans. The new version of the cell phone plans may
provide additional benefits, or in some cases, reduced benefits. As a result, such price comparisons must measure changes
in quality.
Changes in quality refer to changes in differentiation technological characteristics of the cell phone plan due to innovation
or seasonal changes that increase the value or attractiveness of the plan to users (Karamti & Grzybowski, 2010), but that are
not reflected in traditional consumer price indices.
One approach is to use a hedonic price model, which separates out the various components that together determine the
price of a cell phone plan by taking into account quality changes. These components include traditional economic factors as
well as factors affecting consumer behavior (Smith, 2012; Corrocher and Zirulia, 2010; Pietersz, 0000). While hedonic models
are not necessarily ideal for exhaustive analysis of all factors affecting price, they can be quite effective for tracking overall
price behavior and for relating overall price to product quality.
Hedonic price models have already been used extensively for pricing-quality analysis in diverse markets for products
with relatively high heterogeneity. Botric´ (2004) examined changes in the price of desktop personal computers in Croatia,
while Sentürk and Erdem (2010) examined price fluctuations of laptop computers in Turkey. Dewenter et al. (2004) analyzed
the prices of mobile phones in Germany, while Nazari et al. (2010) analyzed them in Iran. Hedonic price models have also
been used to analyze the property market (Selim, 2008; Krsinich, 2009; Yusof and Ismail, 2012).
A traditional price index method by itself cannot capture the full extent of quality changes, so what Griliches (1961) has
called a hedonic quality index can be calculated in parallel. This index quantitatively measures the rate of change in the tech-
nological characteristics that influence the price of a product, similar to a quantity index in traditional price index theory.
This change is determined by the hedonic function’s estimated coefficients or implicit prices for characteristics during the
base period. Despite the highly heterogeneous nature of cell phone plans and their pricing, few studies have used hedonic
price or quality indices to investigate the mobile telephony market in specific countries.1 According to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, telecommunications equipment includes telephone and telefax equipment.
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The present work uses a hedonic approach to calculate a hedonic price index and quality index for the three main mobile
network operators in Croatia – Hrvatski telekom (HT), Vipnet (Vip) and Tele2 (HAKOM, 2014) – for the period 2009–2013.
This period is characterized by negative market conditions of economic recession, reduced revenues, a short-lived telecom-
munications tax and other business threats. The authors’ aim in developing a hedonic model was to examine how changes in
cell phone plan quality relate to changes in the plan’s price.
The results should provide a view of how operators modified cell phone plan prices and quality in these demanding
market conditions and may help operators reduce risks of demand uncertainty associated with the introduction of new cell
phone plan characteristics (Corrocher and Zirulia, 2010; Rogers, 1995; von Hippel, 1994). This is particularly important dur-
ing development of innovative cell phone plans, which are designed to align with mobile users’ characteristics and behavior
(Corrocher and Zirulia, 2010). The results may also provide guidance for operators aiming to maintain their market share in
the face of similar challenges.
The present work is one of the few telecommunications studies on the effects of quality on price of cell phone plans that
adopt a hedonic approach. Varoutas et al. (2008) used such an approach to examine broadband services in Greece from 1997
to 2002. Most of the literature on telecommunications price indices has adopted non-hedonic approaches. Hausman (1999)
examined mobile telephony price movements in the US based on the Consumer Price Index as a function of the Cost-of-
Living Index. Gorko and Bordé (1999), Maresca and Montella (2000) and Deuchars et al. (2001) analyzed the price dynamics
of telecommunications services in Italy, the US and Canada using the unit value method and the matched-model. None of
these studies has attempted to quantitatively measure technological changes and correlate changes in price with changes
in technological quality.
A handful of studies have used a hedonic approach to investigate technological and price changes of cell phone plans.
Karamti (2007) and Karamti and Grzybowski (2010) analyzed the French cell phone plan market from 1996 to 2002, using
a hedonic approach. They analyzed price at the level of the monthly price of the cell phone plan. They analyzed plan quality
in terms of two communication parameters and mostly binary variables describing value-added services, including call
waiting, call forwarding, voice mails, multi-party calls, data/fax transfers, roaming, and multimedia services like email
and WAP. The two communications parameters were percent signal coverage and the number of calls placed that lasted
at least 2 continuous minutes with good sound quality. They, like several other authors, used a semi-log model to calculate
a hedonic price index.
Most of these studies have managed to pack a surprising number of variables into a single hedonic function, yet as far as
the authors are aware, none has succeeded in including both the price of telephone calls and the price differentiation for
different types of calls, such as local, inter-city, long-distance, or roaming. This suggests that much of the literature on
hedonic price models in telecommunications has relied to some degree on proxy variables rather than on the true variables
that describe a product, which may not give the best modeling results (Triplett, 2006).
To avoid this limitation, we adopted Corrocher and Zirulia’s (2010) classification of quality (differentiation) characteris-
tics that completely describe cell phone plans as the first step in developing our hedonic model, which was based on
Lancaster’s (1996) and Rosen’s (1974) definition of a product as a set of characteristics. The present study includes call dif-
ferentiation, as well as the differentiation of free services (free voice minutes and free SMS messages), depending on whether
they are valid 24/7 or only on weekends and on whether they are valid only within the network or towards all networks. On
the other hand, the present model does not take into account the value-added services measured by Karamti (2007) or
Karamti and Grzybowski (2010), since they can be activated for free and have been shown to exert negligible influence
on users’ choice of operator (Paulrajan and Rajkumar, 2011; Gautam and Kumar, 2011).
In addition, the model described here includes fewer qualitative binary variables than the studies of Karamti (2007) and
Karamti and Grzybowski (2010). Instead the present model relies on a larger proportion of quantitative variables that cor-
respond to real numbers. For example, whereas those authors included a binary variable to describe rate category based on
the number of free minutes and arbitrarily defined cut-offs, the present model directly includes the number of free minutes.
The model described here does not take into account network quality or vertical differentiation of the mobile market
(Valletti and Cave, 1999), because the networks of the three operators in Croatia showed a similarly high level of quality
and stability during the study period. In general, vertical differentiation is not a driver of strategic advantage in the Croatian
telecommunications market. Instead, Croatian operators focus on horizontal differentiation and product offerings (cell phone
plans), which requires taking into account a large number of characteristics (attributes) and high heterogeneity. Especially in
light of the absence of systematic analyses of price fluctuations and cell phone plans for the Croatian telecommunications
market, the present study compared the results of the hedonic approach with Croatian TCPI for the same period.
Given the impossibility of obtaining data for pre-paid services, the authors restrict their analysis to postpaid (contract-
based) cell phone plans for residential users. Prepaid users still heavily dominate the Croatian market, but the proportion
of post-paid users is clearly increasing (HAKOM, 2013b). The results described here may help operators increase or retain
postpaid market share under similar market conditions, especially in countries imposing special taxes and fees.
The hedonic model presented here, which is based on cell phone plan characteristics that are easy to quantify and are
useful to users, may help operators identify the characteristics that significantly affect cell phone plan prices. This may help
operators select what characteristics they wish to advertise to the market. The model may be used to analyze operators’
strategic behavior in the market, as well. This may, in turn, help operators correct the quality of their cell phone plans
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countries.3. The mobile telephony market in Croatia
3.1. Historical overview
The mobile telephony market in Croatia, according to the Croatian Regulatory Authority for Network Industries (HAKOM,
2014), currently comprises three mobile network operators: HT as the main operator (market share: 46.88%), Vip as the main
competitor (37.53%) and Tele2 as the alternative competitor (15.59%). The Croatian mobile telephony market was further
liberalized in 1998. The main competitor, Vip, began commercial operations in July 1999. This duopoly lasted approximately
5 years until October 2005, when an alternative competitor, Tele2, entered the market. The market continued to liberalize as
the third operator slowly gained market (Fig. 1) share and it became possible in October 2006 to transfer numbers between
operators. However, national mobile market still remains an oligopoly (Cˇicˇin-Šain et al., 2011).
Since 2008, the new Croatian market has grown rapidly and led operators to offer an increasingly diverse array of cell
phone plans and products; an indicator of the growing competitiveness in the market is the fact that the average Croatian
switches mobile operator every 1–2 years (Ivezic´, 2013). As the mobile telephony market developed in Croatia, operators
began offering a proliferation of cell phone plans that differ from one another in several attributes or characteristics, such
as the amount of free minutes, messages or data transfers included in the plan; and the price of voice calls, messages and
data transfers.3.2. Cumulative effect of negative market conditions on mobile operators in Croatia during 2009–2013
In 2009, macroeconomic pressure tightened on the telecommunications industry and on the economy in general as real
GDP fell 7.4% from the year before and unemployment rose to 16.6%. Since that time, the Croatian economy has been in
strong recession, unemployment has grown to 18% and personal consumption has continued to fall.
While detailed analysis of how the economic recession and the telecommunications tax2 affected mobile operators in
Croatia is lacking, there seems little doubt that they have created significant challenges to maintaining revenues and market
share. Between 2009 and 2010, coinciding with the introduction of the telecommunications tax, the industry experienced a drop
in mobile service demand for the first time since such services were offered in the country. The number of voice minutes fell by
4% and the number of SMS messages by 14% on an annual basis.
After 2008, the Croatian mobile industry reported drops in mobile revenues, total usage, and mobile termination rates, as
well as increasing price competition. In 2009, revenues declined by 5.4% at HT and by 8.9% at Vip (Sutedja, 2010). The
operators themselves indicated that the telecommunications tax alone cost the industry $106 million in 2009 and 2010
(Brnic´ and Ivezic´, 2011). During 2009–2013, mobile termination rates continued to decline due to regulatory pressures
and Croatian accession to the European Union (EU). Call prices towards EU countries fell substantially, amounting to a max-
imum of $0.37 per minute in contrast to previously $1.2–2.1 per minute. The total number of subscribers and penetration
level fell (Fig. 2), most likely due to the recession (Sutedja and Unger, 2009).
These market conditions have also exacted opportunity costs that are more difficult to quantify. Operators have reduced
their investments in network expansion and other types of capital expenditure (Deloitte, 2011). Based on public reports
from Croatian mobile operators, these cuts in investment have affected further development of 2G and 3G networks,
improvements in network coverage and quality, and introduction of 4G networks.4. Data and methodology
4.1. Data sources and collection
The authors were unable to obtain data on previous cell phone plans directly from the operators, probably because the
companies may consider such information strategic in such a highly competitive market (Magnien, 2003). Therefore the data
set was assembled primarily from information gathered from various web sites and magazines focused on information
technology and telecommunications industries.3 The authors had at their disposal annual data on the monthly price of cell
phone plans and their main quantitative and qualitative characteristics (Supplementary Table S1). Data were collected for
249 postpaid (contract-based) residential cell phone plans that were available during 2009–2013 (Supplementary Table S2).2 As one of several measures to increase public revenues during the economic crisis, the Croatian government in August 2009 imposed a 6% tax on mobile
gross revenues from voice services, SMS and MMS. It was rescinded in July 2012 an attempt to motivate further technological development, including the
introduction of a 4G network. For analysis of other countries where the governments have levied similar taxes, please see ICC (2012).
3 Mobil, VidiLab, Mob, Bug, Smartphone Hrvatska, Mobile-Place, PCchip.
Fig. 2. Evolution in distribution of pre- and post-paid mobile users and penetration rates in Croatia, 2008–2013. Data from HAKOM (2014).
Fig. 1. Market share of the three mobile telecommunications operators in Croatia, 2008–2013. Data from HAKOM (2014).
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quality in the telecommunications industry (Radojicˇic´ et al., 2013). Prepaid cell phone plans were not included in the anal-
ysis because of difficulties in obtaining data of sufficient quality for hedonic modeling.4.2. Relevant quality characteristics and definitions of variables
In order to control for quality changes and thereby measure pure price variations, relevant cell phone characteristics were
adopted from Corrocher and Zirulia’s (2010) classification of the qualitative and quantitative characteristics that completely
describe a cell phone plan.
Quantitative variables in the model referred to the numbers of free (subsidized) minutes and free messages (SMS or MMS)
included in the cell phone plan; the amount of free data transfer; the price of calls within the network, to other networks and
to fixed lines; the price of SMS messages within the network or to other networks; the price of an MMS message; and the
price of data transfer. When a user enjoyed an unlimited number of calls to a given destination or network, or when a user
enjoyed an unlimited number of SMS messages or data transfer, then the unit price was set to 0. Since the goal of the present
study was not to examine factors affecting specific price components in detail, the prices for individual services (voice, mes-
saging, data) were considered equivalent to any other characteristic of a cell phone plan, all of which were aggregated to give
the monthly price of the plan (Aizcorbe, 2014).
Qualitative variables did not reflect actual numbers or prices but rather indicated whether the values of quantitative vari-
ables were different under different circumstances (differentiation). For example, if a cell phone plan included free minutes
or free messages, a qualitative variable was added to the model to capture whether the minutes or messages applied to all
networks or only to certain network(s), or only to certain types of lines (mobile or fixed) or only to a specific phone number.
In the same way, qualitative variables captured whether the price of services depended on when they were used (e.g. 7/24,
peak vs. off-peak, special promotional periods).
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reflect whether free minutes in a cell phone plan are valid only for a specific network or during a particular time period.
The model also took into account different billing units for voice calls. A 60/60 billing unit means that any subminute length
of time is rounded up to 60 s before applying the per-minute unit call price. The 60/30 billing unit means that conversations
lasting less than one minute are rounded up to 60 s for the first minute, and then rounded up 30 s thereafter. Certain cell
phone plans also dictate connection charges, such that the user pays an average of 0.20 KN for every call that successfully
connects with the destination.
All variables used in the model with descriptive statistics are shown in Supplementary Table S3.
4.3. Measuring price and quality changes – the hedonic approach
Hedonic regression involves creating regression equations in which the independent variables are various technology-
based characteristics of a product or service, and the dependent variable is the price of that product or service (Botric´,
2004). The goal of this regression analysis is to analyze how the price is affected by changes in product’s differentiation char-
acteristics or quality (Schultze and Mackie, 2002). In the present study, the hedonic approach was used to analyze whether
the monthly price of cell phone plans can be explained by changes in their quantitative and qualitative characteristics.
4.3.1. Hedonic price indices
A hedonic price index is any price index generated by a hedonic function (Triplett, 2006), a process that can be performed
directly using the time dummy and characteristics price method or indirectly using the hedonic price imputation and hedonic
quality adjustment method. The type of hedonic function should be defined from the outset, and it should cover every time
period for which a price index is required (Triplett, 2006).
Several models of a hedonic function have been described (Cropper et al., 1988). The authors tested linear and semi-log
models – the latter takes the logarithm of the dependent variable – and found the linear one to fit the data better (Supple-
mentary Table S4). A double-log model and Box-Cox transformation were not explored because they do not accept data equal
to 0, and the authors wanted a model that would allow, for example, a call price equal to 0 in the case of a cell phone plan
that provides unlimited free minutes. The hedonic linear model has the following form:4 ForPriceti ¼ aþ
Xk
j¼1
bjzji þ eit ð1ÞEq. (1) says that price for any cell phone plan, i, at time t depends on its jth technologically-based characteristic z. Finally, e is
the residual error component for given cell phones plan i in time period t. Importantly, while e is interpreted as statistical
noise in other regression models, it can have economic meaning in hedonic regression (Triplett, 2006). In other words, if
the residual is negative, it may suggest that the cell phone plan costs less than one would expect given the values for its
characteristics. This can arise, for example, when operators offer discounted plans. Conversely, if the residual is positive,
it may mean that the cell phone plan costs too much for the values of characteristics it provides (Triplett, 2006).
When a hedonic function involves data frommultiple time periods, it is possible to assign a binary variable to each period.
In the Time Dummy Hedonic Index method, the combination of product-related coefficients and time-related binary vari-
ables allows calculation of a price change index for that product while controlling for the changes in product attributes
(Watanabe et al., 2010; Botric´, 2004). As a result, Eq. (1) can be used to predict average price change for three periods (base
period s, s + 1, and s + 2) by combining the data for all three periods into a single equation:Priceti ¼ aþ
Xk
j¼1
bjzji þ d1ðDsþ1Þ þ d2ðDsþ2Þ þ eit ð2Þwhere t refers to s, s + 1, and s + 2. Ds+1 and Ds+2 are dummy variables indicating to which period a given cell phone plan
belongs. While Eq. (1) implies a hedonic function using data for only one period, Eq. (2) implies a hedonic function
that includes three periods of data s, s + 1, and s + 2. According to Triplett (2006), this approach is also called pooled or
multi-period pooled regression since data for several periods are pooled together.
The regression coefficients of the cell phone plan differentiation characteristics (bs) may be interpreted either as
consumers’ implicit prices or producers’ marginal cost for the given characteristics (Watanabe et al., 2010; Triplett, 2006).
However, this assumption is not valid for an imperfectly competitive market. To avoid this limitation, we adopted approach
fromWatanabe et al. (2010) and Pakes (2003) – a reduced form4 of hedonic model which focuses on price changes rather than
on the single coefficients’ values estimated from the regression equation and their economic interpretation. This, in turn,
enables unbiased estimate of price changes from the hedonic regression equation despite the potential bias of regression
coefficients (bs) (Watanabe et al., 2010; Doms and Forman, 2005; Feenstra, 1995).
The regression coefficient of the dummy variable d1 shows the residual pure price change between period s and period s
+ 1. Similarly, d2 shows the residual pure price change between period s and s + 2. Pure indicates the change in price after anyfurther discussion on reduced form of hedonic model, please see Watanabe at al. (2010), Pakes (2003), and Anstine (2004).
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adjusted price. If the coefficient on the dummy variable is negative, then it indicates a decrease in cell phone plan prices; if
positive, it indicates an increase.
The larger the number of periods over which data are pooled, the greater the risk that structural changes or other noise in
the system may cause shifts that are not the direct focus of the study. This is a real concern in the case of heterogeneous and
dynamic products like cell phone plans where new product’s characteristics are introduced constantly (Triplett, 2006;
Wenzheng et al., 2006). Therefore the present model calculated the residual or pure price change for paired, adjacent
(contiguous) time periods using a time dummy to indicate pure price change in a linear model (Triplett, 2006). This
adjacent-period approach holds the regression coefficients constant only for two periods, while multi-period regression holds
them constant for a larger number of periods and does not suffer from introduction of new characteristics (Watanabe et al.,
2010; Triplett, 2006).
For example, to calculate the hedonic residual pure price change for the three periods t = s, s + 1 and s + 2, first the
equation for s + 1/s is generated by excluding data for s + 2, then the equation for s + 2/s + 1 is generated by excluding data
for s to obtain average residual pure price changes between periods from time dummy coefficients (ds) for linear model.
From these results, a time series can be constructed by chaining these pure price changes (ds). Assuming a linear model,
one way to calculate the pure price change between period s and s + 2 while controlling for the change in attributes is to
link the single coefficients of time dummy variables:Pure Price Changesþ2=s ¼ dsþ2 þ dsþ1 ð3Þ
To calculate hedonic price indices in the linear model, the initial or reference price has to be calculated (Triplett, 2006).
The present study adopts the approach of de Haan and Diewert (2013): a price index is constructed using the price generated
by the estimated coefficients of a base period regression model, and it is calculated based on the based period average values
of a given cell phone plan characteristic z for each operator (Supplementary Table S5). For continuous characteristics, direct
averages are used; for binary characteristics, the proportions of cell phone plans containing the feature are used. The result-
ing prices for this average cell phone plan are converted to an index by applying previously calculated pure price changes
(ds). Finally, the overall hedonic price index is calculated as the weighted average of firm-level indices. Weights correspond
to the relative proportion of cell phone plans by operator in the sample (0.3534 for HT, 0.3212 for Vip, and 0.3254 for Tele2).
4.3.2. Hedonic quality indices
The bulk of the literature on hedonic price modeling focuses on hedonic price indices to measure real-time variation in
prices, but hedonic modeling can also be used to track variation in the quality of products or services for a given operator,
where quality refers to the user-valued characteristics or attributes that a product or service offers. This involves calculating
a hedonic quality index, which is challenging in large part because changes in cell phone plans occur quite rapidly in the
mobile telephony industry. In the present study, the authors aimed to calculate the average change in characteristics of a
given cell phone plan between periods and then to multiply that change by implicit prices in the base year, in order to assess
the component of price changes due to entirely to quality changes.
According to Triplett (2006), the hedonic quality adjustment (HQA) for a linear model is given by:HQAsþ1=si ¼
Xk
j¼1
bjðzsþ1ij  zsijÞ ð4ÞEq. (4) is itself a quantity change, where j is a technologically-based characteristic, and zsij and z
sþ1
ij are average values for
that characteristic in cell phone plan i during base period s and s + 1, respectively. In other words, the equation measures the
mean change in the cell phone plan characteristics between time periods t = s and s + 1. The quality change is the difference
between the summations of the base period implicit prices (ßijs) for the average set of characteristics that differ between
period s + 1 and base period s. In addition, ßs are used as weights. Yielded values are then converted into percentage change
or hedonic quality index (HQI).
4.4. Hedonic model for measuring price and quality changes of cell phone plans in Croatia
In order to develop a model comprising the characteristics defined in Section 3.1, the authors defined a function of the
overall price for all the characteristics that make up cell phone plan i:Pricei ¼ f ðX;Y ; ZÞ ð5Þ
where X, Y and Z represent the promotional, pricing and billing components of the cell phone plan. In this case, Priceti , or the
price of cell phone plan i during the time period t can be calculated using the equation:Priceti ¼ aþ
XK
j¼1
ajXtij þ
XN
k¼1
bkY
t
ik þ
XB
s¼1
hsZ
t
is þ
XL
o¼1
koM
t
io þ dtDt þ eii ð6Þ
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t
ik and Z
t
is are categories of characteristics related to promotion, price and billing.M
t
io and D
t are dichotomous vari-
ables representing the operator and time period.5. Results of estimation of hedonic price and quality indices
Our strategy was to first perform full-sample regression in order to determine whether individual variables made signif-
icant contributions to the hedonic model, based on p values and multicollinearity (Supplementary Table S4). Multicollinear-
ity was assessed using variance inflation factors (VIFs).5 VIFs have been used in hedonic price model by Belsley et al. (1980),
Kennedy (1985), Fox (1991), Gujarati (1995), and Karamti and Grzybowski (2010). We performed model specification testing to
justify the inclusion of different variable categories in the hedonic model (Supplementary Table S6). Hedonic indices were then
calculated based on the results of time-dummy adjacent-periods regression (Supplementary Table S7).
Hedonic price and quality indices were calculated using procedures described in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 and hedonic Eqs.
(1)–(6) estimated with ordinary least square (OLS) method after testing for normality assumption.6 OLS has proven reliable
for hedonic price models in studies by Court (1939), Stone (1956), Griliches (1961), and more recently by Dewenter et al. (2004),
Triplett (2006), Karamti and Grzybowski (2010), and Watanabe et al. (2010). These indices provide information on the explicit
price (monthly cell phone plan price) and quality (value of plan characteristics). Figs. 3–5 show, respectively, the HPI for
monthly cell phone plan price for the entire Croatian market, HPI by operator, and changes in cell phone plan characteristics
by operator. In all cases, the reference year (defined as 100%) was the midpoint of the study period (2011).
Fig. 3 suggests that the negative market conditions during the study period led to a gradual fall in prices, which was sim-
ilar for all operators (Fig. 4). The largest price decrease occurred between in 2013, when the HPI across all operators fell to
88%, as confirmed in the adjacent-period regression (Supplementary Table S7). The tax was repealed at the beginning of 2012
but then reintroduced for 5 months of that year (Section 2.2).
Lack of price-quality data for mobile telephony in the public domain makes it difficult to verify the external validity of the
hedonic analysis. As a crude validity check, the HPI obtained here was compared with the Croatian TCPI (Croatian Bureau of
Statistics, 2014), which aggregates telecommunication equipment and services. Both indices showed a similar downward
trend (Fig. 3).
To complement the analysis of price, the authors also calculated quality indices during the study period, allowing exam-
ination of the relationship between plan price and quality (Fig. 5). This relationship could then be correlated with changes in
market share for each operator. From 2009 to 2010, Vip made the largest changes in characteristics, which may help explain
the increase in their market share from 40% to 42.80%. These changes involved reducing the price of calls to all networks.
After 2011, Vip reduced the prices of calls to other networks and the unit price for data transfer, while at the same time
reducing the amount of free traffic and increasing the relative contribution of connection fees to overall prices. Vip also
increased the number of cell phone plans that offered free within-network calls, which translated to a reduction in the aver-
age call cost, and Vip offered unlimited or a limited number of free within-network SMS messages.
HT, with the largest market share of all three operators, also showed the largest increase in quality over the study period.
The largest increase occurred between 2012 and 2013, probably in response to new cell phone plans released by Vip
(Savršena plans) and Tele2 (Revolucija plans). This response involved primarily increasing the number of free minutes and
messages, while also decreasing the proportion of services that carried differentiated costs depending on when the services
were used and whether they were within-network. This proportion was 60% in 2009 but 0% in 2013. The proportion of ser-
vices with connection fees also decreased from 80% in 2009 to 14% in 2013. HT reduced the average price per Mb of data
transfer, in part by increasing the number of data services allowing for unlimited traffic. HT also reduced the average price
of calls to all networks. From 2011 to 2013, HT continued to increase quality by increasing the numbers of free minutes and
messages, as well as by increasing the amount of free data transfer.
Tele2 only slightly increased quality during the study period. It did so by continually increasing the volume of free traffic
and reducing call prices. For example, the cost of calling other networks was 0.82 KN/min in 2011 but 0.62 KN/min in 2013.
In addition, Tele2 reduced the price of data transfer that exceeded the free allowance; the price was 20 KN/Mb in 2009 but
only 3.13 KN/Mb in 2013. They also gradually reduced the proportion of services carrying call connection fees.6. Discussion and conclusion
6.1. Developing a hedonic model for the Croatian mobile telephony market
During development of the final linear hedonic model, the authors conducted specification tests to check the significance
of the effect of independent variables on the dependent one (Supplementary Table S6). The direction and magnitude of esti-
mated parameters seem reasonable, and the model shows a good fit to the data. An adjusted R2 value of at least 70% was
obtained for all four adjacent periods; VIFs for most variables in the model is <10, indicating that the multicollinearity level5 No theoretical cut-offs have been established for classifying VIFs as high. Nevertheless, researchers frequently follow the rule of >10 as the cut-off value.
6 Histogram and probability plot of residuals were roughly bell-shaped and nearly linear, respectively. This gave us a good indication that the residuals (and
hence the error term) were normally distributed (data not shown).
Fig. 3. Comparison of overall hedonic price index, telecommunications consumer price index, and consumer price index in Croatia, 2009–2013.
Fig. 4. Hedonic price indices for the three mobile telephone operators in Croatia, 2009–2013.
Fig. 5. Quality changes in cell phone plan characteristics for the three mobile telephone operators in Croatia, 2009–2013.
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Pakes, 2003).
Multicollinearity in hedonic modeling is a well-established problem (de Haan and Diewert, 2013; Triplett, 2006). Such
multicollinearity is also referred to as technologically-based multicollinearity because it arises when the modeled product
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devices such as personal computers (Triplett, 2006) and mobile telecommunications devices, the hedonic modeling
presented here is likely to be affected by multicollinearity. Nevertheless, several lines of evidence suggest that the effect
is minimal and no more than what is likely to be present in other published hedonic price models. First, VIFs were <10
for most variables in the model. Second, the present study focused on the modeling overall price index rather than on the
values of individual regression equation coefficients, which should further reduce the influence of multicollinearity and bias
(de Haan and Diewert, 2013; Watanabe et al., 2010; Pakes, 2003; Feenstra, 1995).
Standard econometrics textbooks do not adequately address multicollinearity in hedonic functions, emphasizing instead
factors more relevant for supply-and-demand models, such as instability of regression coefficients and standard errors
(Triplett, 2006; Tauchen and Witte, 2001). This is certainly an area where further work is needed. The present study, by
showing the feasibility and usefulness of hedonic modeling to understand mobile telephony markets, may help accelerate
research into quantifying and minimizing multicollinearity.
Pooled regression to examine the p values for variables in the model showed that the prices of within-network calls, calls
to landlines and within-network SMS messages did not significantly affect the overall price of telecommunications services.
This probably reflects the fact that for within-network calls and SMS messages, the operator does not pay fees to a second
operator for completing the service. Indeed some cell phone plans intentionally promote within-network services by offering
within-network calls for free. The fact that the price of calls to landlines did not significantly affect overall price suggests that
mobile telephone users communicate mostly with other mobile users.
While it could be argued that certain coefficients vary considerable from one time period to another (Supplementary
Table S7), instability and reversal sign of the coefficients (b) are not particular source of limitation for hedonic models
(Watanabe et al., 2010; Doms and Forman, 2005; Pakes, 2003; Hulten, 2003). Since we adopted reduced form of hedonic
model, overall indices generated by the hedonic regression may be reliable despite the potential bias of the coefficients
(Watanabe et al., 2010; Pakes, 2003). This is because in the Bertrand equilibrium of oligopolistic markets, including Croatian,
regression coefficients don’t represent anymore the implicit price of the given characteristic (Cˇicˇin-Šain et al., 2011;
Watanabe et al., 2010; Pakes, 2003).
Although this study has reached its goals and calculations are being viewed as exploratory since hardly any use of hedonic
approach has been made in measuring cell phone plan price and quality, one potential limitation is the quality and complete-
ness of the data set. Authors had to assemble the data set from various web-based sources because none of the three oper-
ators proved willing to provide cell phone plan information for the study period. Future studies should include a more
rigorous, complete data set. In fact, the lack of data may result with potential degrees-of-freedom or miss-specification prob-
lems given the number of variables in the model and sample size. However, Aizcorbe (2014) and Triplett (2006) have argued
that list of characteristics should be included in the model if they completely describe the product in consumer’s eye. This is,
indeed, the case with Corrocher and Zirulia’s (2010) classification of relevant cell phone plan characteristics included in our
hedonic model. Importantly, numerous hedonic modeling of various heterogeneous products, such as those Bongers and
Torres (2014), Doms and Forman (2005), Noev (2005), and Griliches (1961) involved a similar ratio of observations to vari-
ables in their hedonic models. This is certainly an area where further work is needed and which the present study may help
accelerate.6.2. Negative conditions in the mobile telephony market, effects of quality change on price of cell phone plans, and market share
The main objective of this research was to use hedonic modeling to analyze effects of quality change on monthly price for
cell phone plans in in Croatia in 2009–2013, a period marked by a specific tax on mobile telephone operators, first-ever drop
in demand, a sustained drop in revenues, and a strong recession. A linear hedonic model gave better results than the semi-log
model (Supplementary Table S4), and the results were consistent with the idea that these negative market conditions caused
a slow fall in prices charged by all three operators.
The largest decrease occurred between 2012 and 2013, coinciding with the repeal of the telecommunications tax and the
introduction of 4G cell phone plans. As prices were falling, however, cell phone plan quality was increasing, e.g. the numbers
of free minutes and messages increased and the cost of voice calls decreased.
These findings invite the conclusion that cell phone plans from all three Croatian operators experienced similar price
reduction and increase in quality during this period. In other words, operators opted for increasing quality rather than sig-
nificantly reducing explicit monthly prices of cell phone plans. This is consistent with Karamti and Grzybowski (2010) when
they examined the relationship between price and quality of cell phone plans for the French mobile telephony market during
1996–2002. In that study, the two main French mobile operators were faced with the entry of a third operator, with the dis-
tribution of market shares similar to that in Croatia in 2009–2013.
The similarly between the modeled HPI and Croatian TCPI (Fig. 3) suggests that the model is reliable. Indeed, the prices of
telecommunication equipment and services have been falling in Croatia ever since 2005 (Economic Institute Zagreb, 2013).
The slightly discrepancy between HPI and TCPI may reflect in part a global trend in decreasing mobile device sale prices (IDC,
2013), which affects TCPI. In contrast to the constant and slow increase in the overall consumer price index in Croatia, TCPI
and now the mobile telephony HPI reported here are the only two national-level price indicators showing a continuous
decrease (Economic Institute Zagreb, 2013).
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Europe – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia (Sutedja and Unger, 2009), where market conditions have
been similar to those in Croatia in 2009–2013. Sutedja and Unger (2009) concluded that mobile operators were more resi-
lient to negative market conditions than other sectors for two main reasons, both of which were also observed in the present
study. One reason is that they lowered prices and increased quality, for example by introducing new products and services.
Since users were getting more products or services for the same amount of money, they did not reduce their spending. Sec-
ond, operators reduced their telecommunications investments. These factors helped operators in Eastern and Central Europe
maintain their market share and even attract new users despite the recession. These results argue for the reliability of the
hedonic analysis described here.
This analysis provides experimental support for the predictions of a 2011 report (Deloitte, 2011) suggesting that negative
market conditions in the Croatian telecommunications industry would result in a slow, gradual fall in prices (Figs. 3 and 4).
The observation that cell phone plans for all three operators in Croatia followed a similar price change is consistent with the
idea that mobile telephony remains an oligopoly in this country (Cˇicˇin-Šain et al., 2011). The operators opted for a stepwise
price reduction presumably as a way to maintain market share and to compensate for loss of revenues due to the telecom-
munications tax. For the same reason, they also reduced their investment in 4G infrastructure development. These results
are consistent with the conclusion of Karamti and Grzybowski (2010) that price differences among mobile operators are
the consequence of different cost distributions rather than merely market share.
Although all three Croatian operators reduced explicit prices and increased quality, close analysis of changes in cell phone
plan quality for each operator suggests slightly differences among them (Fig. 5). These slight differences in quality changes
among the three operators may have contributed to the evolution of market share. Vip lost market share from 2011 to 2013
from 39.2% to 37.5%, while Tele2 gained market share from 13.8% to 15.6%, and HT kept the same market share of 46.9%. This
is consistent with a European Commission report (EC, 2013) concluding that during negative market conditions in the
European Union member states in 2004–2012 such as those in Croatia in 2009–2013, main competitors (second-largest
operators) lose their market share, while alternative competitors strengthen their market position.
Vip reduced the price of within-network calls and SMS messages, which may have served to compensate for reducing
the volume of free traffic to other networks. Whether reducing free traffic to other networks was an appropriate tactic is
unclear, however. Market research suggests that customers choose Vip primarily for the quality of its technical support
and professionalism, whereas customers choose HT primarily because their friends and relatives are already on that
network (Tvornica istrazˇivanja, 2013). Therefore it could be argued that Vip should make out-of-network calls and
messaging more attractive within its cell phone plans in order to capture market share from HT. Indeed in 2011, Vip
offered only cell phone plans that provided free minutes within-network, with no plans offering similar benefits for traffic
to other networks. This aligns with the idea that larger operators (main operator and main competitor) are more likely to
offer cell phone plans with on-net discounts to damage alternative competitors (Zucchini at al., 2013). Even in 2012 and
2013, nearly half of 17 cell phone plans offered unlimited minutes only within-network or to fixed lines. Plans offering
1000 free minutes per month to other networks carried monthly fees of $35–107, which is significant in light of the fact
that the average Croatian mobile user spends $232 per year on all services (HAKOM, 2013a). At the same time, HT and
Tele2 were offering plans with unlimited within-network minutes and a certain number of free minutes to other networks
for monthly fees of only $10–36.
Vip changed this in 2012, probably in response to its competitors. In that year, Tele2 offered a Revolucija (Revolution)
package including 5000 min and 512 Mb to any network for $27 per month. In response, Vip released a flat-rate Savršena
(Perfect) plan at the same price including unlimited calls, messages and data transfer to all networks, and eliminating call
connection fees. Based on 2013 data, this new plan has yet to substantially increase hedonic quality index or market share
for Vipnet. In 2014, perhaps in an attempt to reverse its declining market share, Vipnet introduced a Bez granice (Unlimited)
plan including unlimited minutes, messages and data transfer to all networks, as well as certain numbers of free minutes to
EU countries. HT and Tele2, in contrast, have maintained more or less the same rates from 2013.
HT, despite having significantly larger market share than the other operators throughout the study period, increased the
quality of their cell phone plans to the greatest extent. This may reflect fear of losing their dominant position in a telecom-
munications market that is constantly evolving. These results are consistent with the conclusion of Gartner (2009) that mar-
ket position during economic crises is difficult to maintain without major innovation and changes in quality. Vip was the
only Croatian operator to lose market share during the study period, consistent with the idea that increasing revenues by
increasing fees, such as when Vip increased the relative contribution of connection fees to overall prices, encourages users
to switch mobile operator (Infotrend, 2009).
Operators with significantly smaller market share need to be more assertive in retaining their customers and adjusting
the quality of cell phone plans (Gartner, 2009). The hedonic indices for Tele2 during the study period suggests that the com-
pany, with the smallest market share of all three operators, focused on low prices and innovative cell phone plans in order to
maintain its competitiveness and gain market share. This aligns well with market research, which suggests that consumers
choose Tele2 primarily because of its prices (Tvornica istrazˇivanja, 2013). Their Revolucija cell phone plan, which was the first
of its kind on the Croatian market and paved the way for flat-rate plans, may reflect Tele2’s response to the idea that first
movers are more successful in gaining market shares and that consumers demand more for less (Jakopin & Klein, 2009;
Gartner, 2009).
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telecommunications goods and services may reduce tax revenues in the short-term, but increase competitiveness and
productivity in the long term by stimulating investment in infrastructure, particularly in next-generation networks.
Indeed, the Croatian government cited the desire to stimulate investment in 4G networks when they repealed the
telecommunications tax in 2012. This is exactly what happened: soon after the tax repeal, HT and Vip began the process
of 4G implementation (Rep, 2012).
In conclusion, it is clear that our study, as one of the few, reached its goals despite the limitation of the data and demon-
strated how hedonic modeling can be used to provide reliable price and quality indices to analyze relationships between cell
phone plan price and quality. This study is a first step towards increasing the use of hedonic methods for telecommunica-
tions products and services, a particular promising area that requires immediate investigations. Future studies of the present
type could include investigation of additional cell phone plan quality attributes which could reveal overlooked or remove
unnecessary variables from the model; testing of addition functional types of hedonic model for cell phone plans; dividing
the sample into various subgroups in order to investigate nuance theories about price-quality competition among operators;
weighted regression to weight cell phone plans according to their importance on the market; and the extension of this type
of analysis to various other types of plans, such as cell phone pre-paid plans, cell phone business plans, and plans for
triple-play services.
Consequently, continuous studies based on the present work should prove of great value. First, they would provide addi-
tional details based on a more rigorous data set, perhaps obtained directly from operators. Second, they can further improve
the hedonic model so it can be used routinely by statistical offices, policy makers, regulators and other researches. Finally,
they may complement studies analyzing consumer willingness for mobile telecommunication service bundles such as those
by Klein and Jakopin (2014) and Dettling and Hitz (2016).Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.
2016.03.008.References
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